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Abstract This paper proposes a parallel digital
image encryption algorithm based on a piecewise
linear chaotic map (PWLCM) and a four-dimensional
hyper-chaotic map (FDHCM). Firstly, two decimals
are obtained based on the plain-image and external
keys, using a novel parallel quantification method.
They are used as the initial value and control
parameter for the PWLCM. Then, an encryption
matrix and four chaotic sequences are constructed
using the PWLCM and FDHCM, which control the
permutation and diffusion processes. The proposed
algorithm is implemented and tested in parallel based
on a Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) device.
Numerical analysis and experimental results show that
the proposed algorithm achieves a high encryption
speed and a good security performance, which
provides a potential solution for real-time image
encryption applications.
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1 Introduction
The rapid and continual transmissions of digital
information on the internet have had a revolutionary
impact. Providing digital information security in the
transmission channel has become an increasingly
serious issue because the data can be intercepted,
cracked, or destroyed [14, 39]. The number of image
files transmitted on the Internet continues to increase.
Due to bulky data capacity of images, high
redundancy and strong correlations among adjacent
pixels, some traditional encryption algorithms, e.g.,
the preliminary techniques Data Encryption Standard
(DES), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) and
Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) algorithms, are not
efficient for image encryption [42]. Chaotic systems
have many excellent intrinsic properties, including
ergodicity, non-periodicity, non-convergence and
sensitiveness on initial conditions, which have
attracted significant attention for the design of new
image cryptosystems [20,27,28,35].
Many chaos-based image encryption algorithms
have been proposed in terms of the permutation and
diffusion of Shannon encryption architecture. Ref [29]
firstly proposed a logistic map-based encryption
algorithm. Since then, a variety of novel chaotic
systems and chaos-based image encryption methods
have been designed to be applied for the secure
communications, including the logistic map [13,24,26],
the Chua system [4], the Chen system [37], the Arnold
cat map [12] and hyper-chaotic maps [17, 21, 41].
Specifically, several chaotic cryptosystems have been
proposed for image security [23, 30]. However there
still exist some common drawbacks for image secure
application, such as the frangibility of resisting
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known-plaintext attack and differential
cryptanalysis [6, 39], short periodic, the incomplete
effect for the decryption images, and excessive time
for encryption or decryption process [22, 30] which is
not efficient for the secure transmission of image data.
In order to improve the mentioned-above
shortages, Ref. [30] proposed a parallel encryption
method for the image data, which is based on a total
shuﬄing operation. Specifically, the plain-image is
firstly divided into four sub-images, and the geometric
space distribution of each sub-image is
pseudo-randomly disturbed in terms of the logistic
map. Meantime, a total shuﬄing matrix is used to
shuﬄe the pixel position of the entire image, and the
sub-images are encrypted simultaneously in parallel.
However, due to its simple structure, the total
shuﬄing process is not secure because the encryption
algorithm cannot effectively resist the plain-text
attack owing to the shuﬄing process of each sub-image
before that of the total image. Besides, the execution
time of the total process is still a bit high to some
extent [2]. And Ref. [11] proposed an efficient and
secure encryption scheme for medical images based on
chaotic maps, which consists of a bit-level substitution
mechanism to simultaneously achieve the effect of
confusion and diffusion to improve the processing
speed. However, in Ref. [7], the authors proved that
the scheme cannot resist differential cryptanalysis
because the security of the original scheme [11] only
depends on the permutation key instead of on all of
the keys which make the key space greatly reduced,
and the permutation key is not sensitive to the
plain-text to further weaken the capability of resisting
the differential attack. As we all known, differential
cryptanalysis is usually a chosen plain-text attack
which is the most threatening form of attack among
the classical known plain-text attack, known
cipher-text attack, and chosen plain-text attack, and
the basic method of differential cryptanalysis for the
image encryption algorithm is to use pairs of
plain-text related by a constant difference to computer
the differences of the corresponding cipher-texts and
to detect the statistical distribution of the key.
Therefore, the sensitivity degree to the plain-text for
an image encrypted scheme is usually utilized to test
the robustness of the encrypted scheme to resist the
differential cryptanalysis, in that, it is used to judge
whether the encrypted images are totally different or
not even though there is only 1-bit change for original
two plain-texts. Thus, it is very important to have a
good sensitivity to the plain-image information for the
cryptosystems. Moreover, in order to further improve
the speed of the chaos-based cryptosystem, two new
parallel image encryption algorithms have been
proposed in the past few years [15, 18]. Specifically,
compressive sensing is applied for the encryption
scheme in Ref. [15], and a reversible one-dimensional
cellular automata is used to design the parallel scheme
in Ref. [18]. The common feature of these two
encryption schemes is to divide the image into several
fixed-size blocks to encrypt in parallel. Comparing
these two schemes, the encryption scheme in Ref. [18]
has better security than that in Ref. [15] even though
the encryption time of Ref. [15] is shorter than that of
Ref. [18], and the reason is that a lossy compression
method has been used for the scheme in Ref. [15] to
reduce the computing time, which makes the quality
of the decrypted image become worse due to the
implementation of a lossy compression on the platform
of the multi-threading CPU devices.
Comparing to CPU, the GPU is more suitable to
accelerate encryption for large dataset because it has
more computing units [32, 40]. So some parallel image
encryption schemes are now considered to be
implemented on the GPU platform [19, 33]. Besides, a
series of performance analysis results, including
algorithm complexity, speedup, redundancy and code
execution efficiency etc., have demonstrated that GPU
performance is superior to the CPU. Ref. [19] used the
GPU to accelerate a double random phase encoding
(DRPE) algorithm for image’s fast encryption, and
the experimental results showed that the speedup
between parallel and serial computing is amplified
with an increase in image size, which means that the
acceleration effect increases. And in Ref [33], the
author proposed a high speed counter cryptography
mode based on GPU parallelism. Specifically, it
focuses on the symmetric-key cryptography that uses
modern block cipher with a fixed size of data. The
implementation results illustrate that the GPU is a
suitable technology which can significantly improve
the computational performance for the encryption and
decryption of image data.
Based on the above analysis, a good parallel
encryption system should not only ensure security and
robustness to defend from cryptanalysis attacks, but
also have a fast encryption speed to be beneficial for
the real-time transmission of image in practical
application. In this paper, a parallel image encryption
mechanism based on the chaotic map is proposed, and
this mechanism is evaluated by using a GPU device.
The main contributions of this paper include the
followings: (1) a novel parallel decimal quantification
method based on a plain-image and an initial key; (2)
a new encryption matrix based on a parallel generated
chaotic sequence; (3) a novel customized parallel
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permutation-diffusion approach; (4) an image
encryption approach implemented on the GPU based
on OpenCL technology; and (5) a detailed security
analysis of the proposed scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes two chaotic maps of the PWLCM
and FDHCM, the preliminary knowledge of the
decimal quantification process, and the construction of
the encryption matrix. Section 3 reveals the proposed
cryptosystem in detail. Section 4 gives the
implementation method based on a GPU device using
the OpenCL technology. Section 5 provides the
security performance analysis. The final section
concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we mainly introduce two chaotic maps
of the PWLCM and FDHCM, a novel decimal parallel
quantification process based on the plain-image and
external key, and the construction of encryption
matrix.
2.1 Two chaotic maps
The piecewise linear chaotic map (PWLCM) is given
by
x(i+ 1) = F (x(i), µ)
=

x(i)
µ if x ∈ (0, µ];
x(i)−µ
2−µ if x ∈ (µ, 0.5];
F (1− x(i), µ) if x ∈ (0.5, 1),
(1)
where x(i) ∈ (0, 1). When the control parameter
µ ∈ (0, 0.5), it evolves into a chaotic state, and µ can
serve as a secret key. The PWLCM system has a
uniform invariant distribution and very good
ergodicity, confusion and determinacy. Therefore it
can provide an excellent random sequence that is
suitable for the cryptosystem.
The four-dimensional hyper-chaotic map (FDHCM)
used in this paper is given by
x˙1 = a(x2 − x1) + x2x3x4;
x˙2 = cx1 − x2 − x1x3x4;
x˙3 = −bx3 + x1x2x4;
x˙4 = dx1 + x1x2x4,
(2)
where x1, x2, x3, x4 are state variables and a, b, c, d
are real constant parameters. Compared with
low-dimensional chaotic maps, high-dimensional
chaotic maps (especially hyper-chaotic systems) have
a larger key space, better sensitivity, more complex
dynamic characteristics and randomness. The
low-dimensional chaotic maps can be deciphered using
phase space reconstruction and nonlinear prediction
techniques etc., however those techniques cannot
decipher the high-dimensional chaotic systems [25].
We choose a=10, b=3/8, c=28, d=-1, the initial
conditions are (1, 1, 1, 1), and the time step size is
0.0001. Its chaotic behaviour portraits are shown in
Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1 Phase portraits of FDHCM with parameters a=10,
b=3/8, c=28, d=-1. (a)-(c) are 3D views in the x1 − x2 − x3,
x1 − x2 − x4 and x2 − x3 − x4 spaces. (d)-(i) are projections
on the x1 − x2, x1 − x3, x1 − x4, x2 − x3, x2 − x4, x3 − x4
planes.
2.2 A novel parallel decimal quantification
According to the external keys and plain-image
information, a novel parallel quantification method is
designed to obtain the decimal number in the range of
(0, 1), which is used to be the initial value of the
PWLCM to generate chaotic sequences. In this way,
the generated sequence will be strictly related to the
 25 100 158 0 255 18 25 100 158 0 255 18key
Fig. 2 A 6× 6 matrix and an s byte key.
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Fig. 3 The flow chart of the quantification process.
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Fig. 4 The encryption matrix generation process.
external keys and the plain-image information which
can improve the security of the following cryptosystem
to some extent.
Generally, the size of the plain-image is supposed to
be m × l, and the external keys are described with s
bytes (s < m). And the external keys can be copped
with the original information to make the length be
equal to m which will be filled into the (i+1)th column
of the plain-image as shown in Fig. 2. Specifically, the
values of pixel in any row are sorted by ascending order
to get the corresponding index sequence and find the
index number of the first pixel value of this row which
is noted the (i + 1)th. For instance, the pixel values of
the first row of the plain-image with a 6× 6 matrix are
25, 100, 158, 0, 255 and 18 as shown in Fig. 2, and the
corresponding sequence with an ascending order is 0,
18, 25, 100, 158, and 255. So the external keys will be
filled in the third column because the first pixel value
25 is in the third number. Especially, when the pixel
values of the one row are all the same, the external
keys are filled into the (l + 1)th column. As a result, a
new matrix with the size of m × (l + 1) is obtained to
used for the following encryption.
The flow chart of the decimal quantification process
is shown in Fig. 3, which includes the following steps.
– Step A1. Divide the plain-image into m rows, and
multiply all the elements of this row from left to
right to be as A. Specifically, if the ith value of this
row is 0, it will be replaced by i × pi. For example,
the values of a row are 12, 0, 15, 34, 0, 255, 0. After
the replacement, the novel values are 12, 2× pi, 15,
34, 5× pi, 255, 7× pi.
– Step A2. The multiplied value is replaced in terms
of the rule of A = |cos(A mod 360)|, and when it
is larger than 1014, the current value A is updated.
Repeat Step A1.
– Step A3. After the last element of each row is
executed, a novel real number (e.g., A) is obtained.
And the real number will divide by 1014, and we
can obtain a decimal sequence, e.g., d1(i), i=1, 2,
. . . , m.
– Step A4. Repeat the above steps, and calculate all
the elements of a new matrix in the reverse order,
i.e., the elements of the matrix are calculated from
right to left. Then, another decimal sequence is
created, e.g., d2(i).
– Step A5. The sequences d1(i) and d2(i) are
continued to be quantified according to Step
A1-Step A3, and two decimals d˙1 and d˙2 are
obtained.
– Step A6. Compare the decimal d˙1 with d˙2, and get
the decimal d, in that, when d˙1 > d˙2, d is equal to
d˙2/d˙1, Otherwise, d is equal to d˙1/d˙2.
As shown in the above steps, the final
quantification decimal d has a close relationship with
the pixels and external keys. Even if only one bit is
changed for the plain-image or external keys, it will
cause the decimal d be totally different, which is
similar to the avalanche effects of cryptography.
Therefore, this quantification method can not only
effectively improve the randomness of sequence, but
also enhance the security of the encryption system to
some extent.
2.3 The construction of an encryption matrix
A special encryption matrix is constructed based on
the plain-image, external keys and PWLCM chaotic
system which will be used for the confusion and
diffusion processes of the cryptosystem. Here, the size
of a plain-image is supposed to be m × n, and an
external key with 32 bytes is arranged in an array
with 32 values which is in the range of (0, 255). The
detailed process of constructing the encryption matrix
is shown as follows.
– Step B1. The external key is continued to be
quantified as a decimal d′ according to Step
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A1-Step A3 in Section 2.2, i.e., the multiplication
order is from left to right, and each byte is a
multiplier unit.
– Step B2. According to two decimal sequences d (in
Section 2.2) and d′, a new decimal d′′ can be
calculated by d′′ = (d+ d′/2) mod 0.5.
– Step B3. The two decimals d and d′′ are used as
the initial value x(1) and control parameter µ of
the PWLCM chaotic system in Eq. (1). Then a
corresponding chaotic sequence x1 is obtained by
using x1(i) = PWLCM(d, d
′′), where x1(i) is
denoted as x1(i) = x1(1), x1(2) · · · , x1(200 +m)
and x1(i) ∈ (0, 1) with the 10−15 precision, i=1, 2,
· · · , 200 +m.
– Step B4. Similarly, the sequence x2 can be
calculated by x2(i) = PWLCM(d
′/2, d′′)/2, where
i=1, 2, · · · , 200+m.
– Step B5. The last m values of the sequences x1
and x2 are served as the initial value x(i) and
control parameter µ of the PWLCM chaotic
system. Iterate Yi−200(j) = PWLCM(x1(i),x2(i))
for n − 1 times, and the m groups of Yi sequences
are obtained, where i = 201, 202, · · · , 200 + m and
j = 1, 2, · · · , n.
– Step B6. As shown in Fig. 4, realign the m groups
of sequences and the m × n decimal matrix to get
the final encryption matrix K.
The encryption matrix K is implemented in parallel
by the PWLCM and the size of which is equal to the size
of the plain-image. It effectively increases the security
of the encryption system to make the matrix cracking
be almost impossible. In addition, cascading the chaotic
systems can also avoid the performance degradation of
chaos.
3 The proposed image encryption system
In this section, a novel parallel image encryption
scheme is introduced. There are three stages in the
encryption process. First, two quantification decimals
are obtained through external keys and plain-image
information. They are used as the initial value and
control parameter in the PWLCM chaotic system.
Then, an encryption matrix and four permutation
sequences are constructed based on the PWLCM and
FDHCM chaotic system. Finally, a plain-image is
permutated and diffused by permutation sequences
and the encryption matrix. In addition, the
corresponding image decryption process is designed.
A good cryptosystem can not only produce
different strong key streams from different
plain-images, but also complete self-adoption
encryption based on the plain-images. The proposed
image encryption system perfectly meets these
requirements. We assume that the size of the
plain-image P is m × n, and the external keys are 32
bytes. The encryption process is shown in Fig 5. The
specific implementation process is as follows.
– Step C1. The external keys are filled with plain
images, and a new matrix is obtained using the
implementation method in Section 2.2.
– Step C2. Two quantification decimals d and d′ are
obtained based on plain-image information and
external keys, as described in Section 2.2 and
Section 2.3. They are used as the initial value and
control parameter in the PWLCM chaotic system.
– Step C3. Iterate the PWLCM chaotic system
199+x, where x = max(m,n) times, a chaotic
sequence with the size of 200+x is generated, and
a matrix K is reconstructed according to the
algorithm in Section 2.3. The matrix K is
quantified using A = (K × 1015 mod 8)+1 and
B = K× 1015 mod 256, in order to ensure that the
value of A and B are in the range of (1, 8) and (0,
255), respectively.
– Step C4. After elements from 101 to 104 of the
chaotic sequence are used for the FDHCM chaotic
system as the initial values, iterate it x times, and
the four chaotic sequences xF1,xF2,xF3,xF4 are
External key
Quantization 
value d and d' 
Hide the Value d 
into chip image
Use the PWLCM 
to get a chaotic 
sequence
Construct the 
diffusion matrix 
K
Permutation and 
diffusion process
Permutation and 
diffusion process
in reverse order
Construct the 
diffusion matrix 
K
Use the PWLCM 
to get a chaotic 
sequence
Diffusion the 
image again
Quantization 
value d and d'
and diffusion the 
image in reverse 
order 
External key
Use the FDHCM 
to get four chaos 
sequences
Use the FDHCM 
to get a chaotic 
sequence
 
Fig. 5 The image encryption and decryption (in grey)
processes.
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generated. Then they are quantified by
xF1(i) = (xF1(i)× 1015 mod n) + 1,
xF2(i) = (xF2(i)× 1015 mod n) + 1,
xF3(i) = (xF3(i)× 1015 mod m) + 1,
xF4(i) = (xF4(i)× 1015 mod m) + 1.
(3)
– Step C5. The matrix A is used to control the pixel
of image P to cyclic shift to the right in the
bit-plane by P1(i, j) = BR(P(i, j), A(i, j)), and
the new matrix P1 is obtained, where the BR
represents the pixel cyclic shift to right in bit-plane
operation, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m and j = 1, 2, · · · , n. For
example, the value of the image P and matrix A
in the coordinates (1, 1) are 125 and 5. The right
cyclic shift of 125 by five bits is 235. Therefore, the
current value 125 is replaced by 235.
– Step C6. The sequence xF1 is used to control the
right cyclic shift of the odd-numbered row in P1.
Conversely, the sequence xF2 controls the left cyclic
shift of even-numbered row. Similarly, the sequences
xF3 and xF4 control the P1 odd-numbered line and
even-numbered line cyclic shift up and down. Thus
the new matrix P2 is obtained from
P2(i, j) =

CR(P1(i, j),xF1(i)) i is odd;
CL(P1(i, j),xF2(i)) i is even;
CU(P1(i, j),xF3(j)) j is odd;
CD(P1(i, j),xF4(j)) i is even,
(4)
where CR, CL, CU , and CD denote the cyclic
shift operations in the four vertical directions,
respectively, i=1, 2, · · · , m, j=1, 2, · · · , n.
– Step C7. The sequences xF1 and xF2 are used to
control the exchange of the row P2. If xF1(i) 6=
xF2(i), P2(i, j)=ER(P2(xF1(i), j)),P2(xF2(i), j)).
In the same way, sequences xF3 and xF4 control
the exchange of the column P2. If xF3(j) 6= xF4(j),
P2(i, j) = EC(P2(i,xF3(j)),P2(i,xF4(j))). The
ER and EC represent the exchange operations for
the row and column, respectively, and i=1, 2, · · · ,
m, j=1, 2, · · · , n.
– Step C8. The image P2 is diffused by matrix B.
The encryption image E is obtained by
E(i, j) = ((P2(i, j) + B(i,j)) mod 256) ⊕ B(i,j),
where ⊕ represents the bitxor operation, i=1, 2,
· · · , m and j=1, 2, · · · , n.
– Step C9. The decimal d is hidden from the
encryption image E. For example, if the decimal d
is 0.354864172356179, and the first pixel in the
encryption image E is v. The decimal d is divided
into eight integers 39, 57, 41, 86, 65, 43, 12, and 7.
They will replace the eight pixels, which are the
coordinates between (v, n) and (v, n-7) in
encryption image E. If v > n, the new line number
t is obtained by t = v mod n, and the eight pixels
of coordinates between (t, n) and (t, n-7) are
replaced.
– Step C10. In addition to the above steps, the
encryption image E is applied by an extra round of
XOR operation in the bit-plane. This can further
enhance cryptosystem security and obtain a
uniform distribution of encrypted images to defend
against statistical attack and differential attack.
The operation process is given by
E(i+ 1, 1) = E(i, 1)⊕E(i+ 1, 1);
E(i+ 1, 2) = E(i, 2)⊕E(i+ 1, 2);
...
E(i+ 1, n) = E(i, n)⊕E(i+ 1, n);
E(1, j + 1) = E(1, j)⊕E(1, j + 1);
E(2, j + 1) = E(2, j)⊕E(2, j + 1);
...
E(m, j + 1) = E(m, j)⊕E(m, j + 1),
(5)
where i = 1, 2, · · · ,m and j = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Now the encryption image E is obtained and the
quantification decimal is randomly hidden in E.
According to symmetric encryption principles, the
process of decryption is an inverse process, as shown
in Fig. 5. The details are given by the following steps.
– Step D1. First, a round of inverse XOR-operation in
terms of the above Step C10 is performed.
– Step D2. According to the first pixel in the
encryption image, the location of the decimal
replaced is locked, and the eight integers in the
cipher-image are taken out. For example, they are
39, 57, 41, 86, 65, 43, 12, and 7, and then, the
decimal d is reconstituted by d = 3 × 10−1 + 5 ×
10−2 + · · ·+ 7× 10−8 + · · ·+ 7× 10−14 + 9× 10−15.
– Step D3. The decimal d′ and the encryption
matrices A and B are reconfigured in the same
way of Section 2.2 and 2.3. Then, the four chaotic
sequences xF1, xF2, xF3, xF4 are reconstructed as
described in the above Step C4.
– Step D4. In terms of the sequences xF1, xF2, xF3,
xF4 and encryption matrixes A and B, the
encryption image is executed by the processes of
permutation and diffusion in reverse order, and the
decrypted image is obtained.
4 Algorithm implemented on the GPU
In this section, the parallel image encryption
algorithm is designed and implemented on a GPU
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device. The proposed algorithm consists of four stages:
the generation of quantification decimal, the
construction of encryption matrix, the process of
image permutation and the process of diffusion. If the
four stages can be processed in parallel, the execution
time can be reduced, which ensures the security of
image encryption and in the meantime improves the
efficiency of the algorithm. The four stages of the
proposed algorithm have a high degree of parallelism,
thus it is possible to implement it in parallel. Fig. 6
shows the flow chart of the image encryption
algorithm on the GPU.
The corresponding kernel parameters are given in
Table 1, and the related symbol descriptions are
shown in Table 2. The first kernel is the process of
obtaining two quantification decimals, and the
concrete implementation method is as shown in
Algorithm 1. In Algorithm 1, the function M()
represents external keys filled in the plain-image and
the function Q() is the parallel quantification process.
We set the NDRange as one-dimensional. The global
work size and local work size parameters are [m × n,
0, 0] and [1, 0, 0]. The encryption matrix can be
obtained by using the second kernel, and the kernel
pseudo-code is as shown in Algorithm 2. We use the
inputs of the quantification decimals d and d′ and the
image size m and n. Two encryption matrices A and
B are outputted, which are used in the permutation
and diffusion processes. Algorithm 3 shows the process
of permutation. From pseudo-code Line 2 to 6, the
encryption matrix A is used to control the
plain-image pixel cycle shift in the bit-plane. The
different rows and columns of the image are cyclic
shifted by the chaotic sequence xF1, xF2, xF3, xF4, as
shown by Line 7 to 20 of Algorithm 3. Then the image
pixel of different rows and columns are exchanged as
Line 21 to 30 shows. Finally, Algorithm 4 represents
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Fig. 6 The parallel image encryption mechanism.
the fourth kernel method, which is the diffusion
process of image encryption. The permutated image
P1 and encryption matrix B are executed by the
bitxor operation (see Line 3 to 5 of Algorithm 4), then
the encryption image E is finally obtained through a
new round of bitxor operation in the bit-plane, as
shown by Line 6 to 11 of Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 1 Get quantification decimals
kernel void GetQD()
Input: P, keys, m, n, s
Output: d, d′
1: j←−get global id(0)
2: C←−M(P, keys)
3: for each i ∈ [0, s− 1] do
4: d′←−Q(keys(i,j))
5: end for
6: for each i ∈ [0,m× n] do
7: d←−Q(C(i,j))
8: end for
9: return d, d′
Algorithm 2 The encryption matrix construction
kernel void ConEM ()
Input: m, n, d, d′
Output: A, B;
1: j←−get global id(0)
2: d′′←−(d+d′/2) mod 0.5
3: for each i ∈ [0, 200 +m− 1] do
4: x1(i)←−PWLCM(d, d′′, i)
5: end for
6: for each i ∈ [0, 200 +m− 1] do
7: x2(i)←−PWLCM(d′/2, d′′, i)/2
8: end for
9: for each k ∈ [201, 201 +m− 1] do
10: K(k, j)←−PWLCM(x1(k, j), x2(k, j))
11: end for
12: for each r ∈ [0, m× n− 1] do
13: A(r, j)←−(K(r, j)×1015 mod 8)+1
14: B(r, j)←−K(r, j)×1015 mod 256
15: end for
16: return A, B
5 Simulations and security analysis
This section gives the simulation results of the
proposed scheme. The encryption and decryption
programs are executed by Microsoft Visual C++2010
and Windows 7 operating system. The four
parameters of the FDHCM are a=10, b=3/8, c=28
and d=-1. The external keys are 184, 52, 1, 249, 252,
177, 99, 209, 256, 24, 61, 102, 57, 240, 49, 249, 113, 29,
154, 196, 101, 64, 199, 5, 133, 103, 45, 197, 123, 243,
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Table 1 The parameter configurations of four kernels.
NDRange global work size local work size Input Output
kernel void GetQD() 1-D [m× n, 0, 0] [1,0,0] P, keys, m, n, s d, d′
kernel void ConEM () 1-D [m× n, 0, 0] [1,0,0] d, d′, m, n A, B
kernel void Confusion() 1-D [∆, 0, 0] [∆,0,0] P, A, xF1,xF2,xF3,xF4, m, n P2
kernel void Diffusion() 2-D [m, n, 0] [16,16,0] P1, B, m, n E
Table 2 Related symbol descriptions.
P Plain-image
m, n The size (length, width) of the image
keys External keys
s The size of the external keys
∆ ∆=max(m, n)
P1,P2 The confusion and diffusion image
d,d′ Quantification decimals
A,B Encryption matrices
xF1,xF2,xF3,xF4 Confusion sequences (in Section 3 )
E Encrypted image
Algorithm 3 The encryption process of confusion
kernel void Confusion()
Input: P, A, m, n, xF1,xF2,xF3,xF4
Output: P2;
1: j←−get global id(0)
2: if j < m then
3: for each i ∈ [0, n] do
4: P1(i, j)←−(P(i, j)(A(j) % 8))‖((P(i, j) A(j)
% 8))
5: end for
6: end if
7: if (j % 2 6= 0) then
8: for each i ∈ [0,m− 1] do
9: P2(i, j)←−circshift(P1(i, j),xF1(i))
10: elseif
11: P2(i, j)←−circshift(P1(i, j),−xF2(i))
12: end for
13: end if
14: if (j % 2 6= 0) then
15: for each i ∈ [0, n− 1] do
16: P2(j, i)←−circshift(P1(j, i),xF3(i))
17: elseif
18: P2(j, i)←−circshift(P1(j, i),−xF4(i))
19: end for
20: end if
21: for each r ∈ [0,m− 1] do
22: if (xF1(r) 6= xF2(r)) then
23: P2(xF1(r), j))←→(P2(xF2(r), j))
24: end if
25: end for
26: for each k ∈ [0, n− 1] do
27: if (xF3(k) 6= xF4(k)) then
28: P2(j,xF3(k))←→(P2(j,xF4(k)))
29: end if
30: end for
31: return P2
Algorithm 4 The encryption process of diffusion
kernel void diffusion()
Input: P1, B, m, n
Output: E
1: i←−get global id(0)
2: j←−get global id(0)
3: if (i < m)&&(j < n) then
4: E(i, j)←−(P2(i, j) +B(i, j))⊕B(i, j) mod 256
5: end if
6: for each i ∈ [0,m− 2] do
7: E(i+ 1, j)←− E(i+ 1, j)⊕E(i, j)
8: end for
9: for each j ∈ [0,n− 2] do
10: E(i, j + 1)←− E(i, j + 1)⊕E(i, j)
11: end for
12: return E
33, and 75 (32 Bytes) in decimal. A number of
experiments were performed based on several images,
which were used as plain-images with the sizes of
128 × 128, 256 × 256, 512 × 512 and 1024 × 1024. In
Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, we show the encryption and
decryption results of the image of Lena with of the
size of 512 × 512, which were executed on the CPU
and GPU devices, respectively. In the following
subsections, several tests are discussed to verify the
security of the proposed cryptosystem.
(b)(a) (c)
Fig. 7 Encryption and decryption results on a CPU device.
(a) Original image; (b) Encryption image; (c) Decryption
image.
5.1 Encryption efficiency analysis
To ensure real-time data transmission, the image
encryption algorithm should guarantee the security of
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(b)(a) (c)
Fig. 8 Encryption and decryption results on a GPU device.
(a) Original image; (b) Encryption image; (c) Decryption
image.
Table 3 The encryption time of the different size images on
CPU and GPU devices.
Image size
Time (ms)
Speed-up ratio (r)
CPU GPU
128× 128 6.1239 0.7120 8.6010
256× 256 25.4828 1.8216 13.9892
512× 512 92.6924 3.4365 26.9729
1024× 1024 396.5155 6.9153 57.3389
transmission and also have a fast speed to encrypt the
image. The proposed parallel image encryption scheme
is processed on the CPU and GPU devices, and the
speed-up ratio r is calculated, which can be defined by
r = Ts/Tp, where Ts and Tp are the executed time on
the CPU and GPU, respectively. We use four different
image sizes to compare the encryption speeds of both
the devices. The experimental results are shown in
Table 3.
From Table 3 we can see that regardless of the
used devices (GPU or CPU), if the image size
increases, the processing time is longer, but the
speed-up ratio is also greater. The time spent on the
GPU is less than CPU. For example if the image size
is 128 × 128, the speed-up ratio r is 8.6. However,
when the image size is 1024 × 1024, the r increases to
57.3. Thus the proposed algorithm processed the
larger size image on the GPU more efficiently than on
the CPU, which also indicates that the execution of
the encryption algorithm is improved using the
parallel computing via a GPU device.
5.2 Key space analysis
The key space of an encryption algorithm is the set of
different keys that can be used for encryption. The
key space should be sufficiently large to defend against
brute-force attack. In the proposed cryptosystem, the
keys are 1). the parameter µ and the initial value x(0)
of the PWLCM; 2). the parameters a, b, c, d and the
initial values xF1(1), xF2(1), xF3(1), xF4(1) of the
FDHCM; and 3). the 256-bit external keys. For the
parameters and initial values of the PWLCM and
FDHCM, if the precision is 1015, the key space size is
10150. The size of the external keys is 256-bit, which
means that the key space is 2256. Therefore, the total
key space is S = 10150× 2256. In addition, the different
plain-images generate exclusive initial values and
control parameters. The key space is probably greater
than 10150 × 2256. In this case, such a large key space
can guarantee security against brute-force attacks.
5.3 Differential attack
To resist a differential attack, a secure cryptosystem
should be sensitive to the plain-image. Small changes
(e.g., one bit) in the plain-image must create a large
difference in the encrypted image. Differences can be
measured by two criteria, i.e. the number of pixel
change rate (NPCR) and the unified average changing
intensity (UACI). The former is used to measure the
number of different pixels between two images, and
the latter is used to measure the average intensity
difference. The NPCR and UACI are defined by
NPCR =
∑
i,j D(i, j)
N
× 100%
and
UACI =
1
N
[∑
i,j
|E1(i, j)− E2(i, j)|
2n − 1
]
× 100%,
where N is the total number of pixels in the image, n
is an n-bit greyscale, and E1 and E2 are the two
cipher-images whose corresponding plain-images have
only a one-bit difference. The difference array D(i, j)
is determined by the following rule: when pixels (i,j)
in E1 and E2 are different (i.e., E1(i, j) 6= E2(i, j)),
then D(i, j) = 1; otherwise, D(i, j) is 0. The
probability distribution of D(i, j) is given by
D(i, j) =
{
0, C1(i, j) = C2(i, j), p0 =
1
2n
;
1, C1(i, j) 6= C2(i, j), p1 = 1− 12n .
In addition, the expected values of the NPCR and
UACI for a strong encryption scheme are given by
NPCRe = 1− 1
2n
and
UACIe =
1
N
2
∑2n−1
i=1
i× (2n − i)
2n − 1
 ,
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respectively. For an 8-bit grey scale image, the NPCRe
and UACIe are 99.6094% and 33.4635%. In this
approach, the quantitative measures of NPCR and
UACI are calculated for five different plain-images,
and their results are shown in Table 4. The tested
pixels are all at (1, 1) in each image.
In order to further verify the sensitivity of the
plain-image, all pixels in the image with the size of
256 × 256 are selected, and each pixels lowest bit is
changed to obtain 65536 corresponding cipher-images.
Comparing these 65536 cipher-images with the
original encrypted image, we can obtain the NPCR
and UACI. The results are shown in Fig. 9. The
average NPCR and UACI for these 65536 tests are
99.6203% and 33.4805%, which are better than the
expected values. It indicates that the proposed
encryption scheme is very sensitive to the small
changes in the plain-image and that the rate of
influence related to single-pixel change in the
plain-image is very high. Therefore, the proposed
encryption algorithm is robust against differential
attack.
Table 4 The NPCR and UACI for different plain-images.
Images Lena Baboon Peppers Plane Elaine
NPCR(%) 99.6399 99.6132 99.6244 99.6124 99.6052
UACI(%) 33.6910 33.4354 33.4349 33.4085 33.5370
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Fig. 9 The results of differential attack. (a) NPCRs for
all modified plain images; (b) UACIs for all modified plain
images.
5.4 Key sensitivity analysis
Key sensitivity is an essential feature for any secure
algorithm that can resist brute-force attack. Several
key sensitivity tests are performed in this approach.
Fig. 10(b) shows the encrypted image of Lena with
the correct encryption keys. The FDHCM parameters
are a=10, b=3/8, c=28, and d=-1, and the external
keys are 184, 52, 1, 249, 252, 177, 99, 209, 256, 24, 61,
102, 57, 240, 49, 249, 113, 29, 154, 196, 101, 64, 199, 5,
133, 103, 45, 197, 123, 243, 33, and 75. Firstly, the
parameters of the FDHCM are fixed, while the input
external keys are changed by only one bit. The
cipher-image is shown in Fig. 10(c). Then, the
external keys are fixed, while the FDHCM parameters
change by one bit, e.g., a=10+10−14, b=3/8+10−14,
c=128+10−14, d=-1+10−14. We obtain their
cipher-images as shown in Fig. 10(d) and (g).
Comparing them with the original cipher-image shown
in Fig. 10(b), the five differential charts are obtained
as shown in Fig. 10(h)-(l). Fig. 10(m)-(q) are the
histograms of Fig. 10(h)-(l), which show that there are
huge differences between the original cipher-image and
Fig. 10(c)-(g). The NPCR values of the five
experiments are 99.62%, 99.64%, 99.61%, 99.63% and
99.61%. As the previous test results indicate, a tiny
difference in the key results in major changes in the
corresponding cipher-images. Therefore, the proposed
encryption scheme has high key sensitivity.
5.5 Statistical analysis
A histogram shows the distribution of pixels in an
image. The encrypted image of a good cryptosystem
should have a uniform histogram to resist any
statistical attacks. The histograms of the original five
plain-images and their corresponding encrypted
images are shown in Fig. 11. We can see that the
distributions of all cipher-images appear to be uniform
regardless of how their original images are related.
The adjacent pixels of the original image have a high
correlation in the horizontal, vertical and diagonal
directions. An ideal encryption algorithm can make
the correlation coefficients of the pixels in the
encrypted image be sufficiently low to resist statistical
attacks. To analyse and compare the correlations of
the adjacent pixels in the plain- and cipher-image, the
image Lena was used as an example. We randomly
choose 1014 pairs of adjacent pixels in the horizontal,
vertical and diagonal directions from the plain-image
and its encrypted image. The correlation distributions
of two adjacent pixels in three directions are shown in
Fig. 12.
A parallel image encryption algorithm based on the piecewise linear chaotic map and hyper-chaotic map 11
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
(j) (k) (l)
 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
0 50 100 150 200 250
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
0 50 100 150 200 250
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
0 50 100 150 200 250
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
0 50 100 150 200 250
(m) (n)
(o) (p)
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
0 50 100 150 200 250
(q)
 
Fig. 10 The results of key sensitivity analysis. (a) is the
plain-image Lena. (b) is the cipher-image with the correct
encryption keys. (c) is the cipher-image with a slight change
in the external key. (d)-(g) are cipher-images with a slight
change in the FDHCM parameters. (h)-(l) are the differences
between original cipher-image and (d)-(g), (m)-(q) are the
grey histograms of (h)-(l).
It is obvious that the plain-image has a strong
correlation among adjacent pixels. However, the
correlation in the corresponding cipher-image is
largely weakened. We calculate the correlation
coefficient rxy of each pair by
rxy =
cov(x, y)√
D(x)D(y)
, (6)
where
cov(x, y) =
1
N
∑N
i=1
(xi − E(x))(yi − E(y)),
D(X) =
1
N
∑N
i=1
(xi − E(x))2,
E(X) =
1
N
∑N
i=1
xi,
x and y are the greyscale values of two adjacent pixels in
the image, and N is the total number of pixels selected
from the image.
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Fig. 11 The histogram of the five different plain- and
chiper- images. (a)-(e) The histograms of plain-images Lena,
Baboon, Pepper, Plane and Elaine; (f)-(j) The histograms of
corresponding cipher-images.
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Table 5 Correlation coefficients of plain- and cipher-images.
Images
Correlation coefficients in
Horizontal Vertical Diagonal
Plain Cipher Plain Cipher Plain Cipher
Lena 0.9768 0.0073 0.9667 0.0090 0.9493 -0.0053
Baboon 0.8627 -0.0019 0.7719 0.0074 0.7245 0.0005
Pepper 0.9634 0.0092 0.9755 0.0068 0.9670 -0.0084
Plane 0.9671 -0.0079 0.9649 0.0014 0.9354 -0.0015
Elaine 0.9743 -0.0025 0.9731 -0.0021 0.9623 0.0063
The calculation results are listed in Table 5. These
results clearly show that the correlation coefficients of
the plain-image are close to 1, while those of the
cipher-image are nearly 0. There is no correlation
between neighbouring pixels in the cipher-image. From
Table 5, we can see that the proposed algorithm has
good characteristics for withstanding statistic attacks.
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Fig. 12 Distributions of two adjacent pixels in the plain-
image and in the cipher-image. (a) horizontal correlation of
original image, (b) horizontal correlation of cipher image, (c)
vertical correlation of original image, (d) vertical correlation
of cipher image, (e) diagonal correlation of original image, (f)
diagonal correlation of cipher image.
5.6 Entropy analysis
Information entropy is the most important measure of
randomness. The source of information is defined as m;
we can use
H(m) =
∑2n−1
i=0
p(mi)log2
1
p(mi)
(7)
to calculate information entropy, where p(mi) is the
probability of the mi. Assume that there are 2
8 states
of the symbols and that they appear with the same
probability. According to Eq. (7), we can obtain the
ideal H(m) = 8, which shows that the information is
random. Therefore, for a ciphered image with 256 grey
levels, the entropy should ideally be close to 8. The
closer it is to 8, the lower the probability for the
cryptosystem to divulge any information. We use
Eq. (7) to calculate the information entropy of the five
cipher-images. The entropy values of the five
cipher-images are shown in Table 6, and they are all
close to the ideal value of 8, which indicates that the
proposed algorithm has a good property of
information entropy.
Table 6 The entropies of different cipher-images.
Images Lena Baboon Pepper Plane Elaine
Entropy 7.999382 7.999280 7.999283 7.999344 7.999376
5.7 Chosen/known plain-image attack
In this paper, we consider the following three points to
effectively avoid the known-plaintext and
chosen-plaintext attacks: (a) The construction of
ergodic sequences is based on the initial key and
different plain-images, and they are produced by
PWLCM and FDHCM chaotic systems. When the
plain-image is changed, there are different initial
values and system parameters. Even for the same
original image, the initial values and the system
parameters are totally different if the image has a
small change; (b) The construction of the encryption
matrix is based on PWLCM chaotic systems. It is
generated in parallel with the size m× n. The possible
existing different permutations could achieve m! × n!,
which shows a strong robustness; and (c) The
permutation and diffusion processes can occur at the
same time. Therefore, our algorithm has high
dependency on the plain-image and is secure against
known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks [16,46].
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For plain-image attacks, the cryptanalyst tries to
find the secret key by using all black or all white
images as special plain-images to attack the
encryption algorithms. Special images can make the
encryption algorithm unsafe, and the keys are
obtained by analysing the encrypted image if the
cryptosystem is relatively simple. However, it cannot
decrypt other cipher-images using the same keys
because the keys of our cryptosystem are strictly
closed to the plain-image information. Different
plain-images will produce totally different secret keys.
Therefore, our encryption algorithm can effectively
resist the known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext
attacks.
5.8 Occlusion and noise attack analysis
During the transmission of cipher-images via the
networks, they may be cropped or influenced by noise;
or some data may be lost because of a congested
network or malicious destruction. Therefore, it should
be determined if an encryption scheme is able to resist
cropping and noise attacks [45]. If the damaged
cipher-image can be recovered successfully, the
encryption scheme has the ability to defend against
occlusion and noise attacks [3, 5, 34]. Firstly, we test
the ability of our encryption scheme to resist an
occlusion attack. Fig. 13(a)-(d) show the experimental
results of data loss attacks on the cipher-image of
Fig. 7(b) with different occlusions, and Fig. 13(e)-(h)
show the recovered images. From the results, we can
see that when the cipher-images have 12.5%, 25%,
50%, 75% occlusion, the image information can still be
recognized even though a strong occlusion attack has
occurred. This achieves a better performance than the
encryption schemes in [5, 36], which fails to complete.
It is proven that our scheme is immune against
occlusion attack. For example, if less than 25% of the
cipher data is lost, the resolution of the recovered
images shown in Fig. 13(e)-(f) contains almost all
visual information of the plain-image. Even though
75% of the cipher-image shown in Fig. 13(d) is
occluded, the decrypted image can still be recognized,
as shown in Fig. 13(h). Therefore, the proposed
method is capable of resisting occlusion attack.
The salt and pepper noise and Gaussian attack are
evaluated here since they are two typical noises.
Fig. 14(a)-(c) are the encrypted Lena images, which
are influenced by the salt and pepper noise with 5%,
10%, and 20% densities. Fig. 14(d)-(f) are the
decryption of Fig. 14(a)-(c) and show that the
encrypted image influenced by the salt and pepper
noises can be decrypted correctly. Fig. 15 illustrates
the cipher-image of Fig. 7(b) affected by Gaussian
noise with different variances and the corresponding
decrypted image. From Fig. 15(c)-(f), we can see that
when the variances of the noise are 0.0001, 0.0003 and
0.0005, the image information can be clearly
recognized. Compared with [3], we find that under the
same conditions, the performance of the proposed
algorithm in this approach is much better. Therefore,
the proposed method has the capability to resist
occlusion and noise attacks.
5.9 Speed analysis and comparisons
In addition to security evaluations for image
cryptosystem schemes, the execution time is a very
important factor, especially for real time multimedia
applications. To evaluate the proposed scheme, the
standard image Lena with a size of 512×512 is
selected. The hardware environment is based on an
Intel Core i7 CPU, an NVIDIA GeForce GTX 750 Ti
GPU, and 8 GB memory. The test is executed 500
times. The mean test time of every step is listed in
Table 7. As Fig. 16 shows, the quantification process
and the construction of the encryption matrix occupy
15.1255% and 11.1302% of the total time, and the
pixel permutation and diffusion process takes up
54.1527% of the total time. Compared with the
approaches of [11, 15, 30], the proposed encryption
method has higher security because its quantification
design is more complex and effective. The quantified
decimal is obtained through a novel parallel scheme,
and the speed is faster than Ref [27]. The initial
values of chaotic map are strictly related to
plain-image information.
Comparisons with other algorithms are listed in
Table 8, which includes information entropy, key
space, NPCR and UACI values, and execution time.
As seen from Table 8, the entropy value of the
proposed algorithm is better than that of other
schemes. In terms of the key space, it should be larger
than 2100 to defend from a brute force attack [9]. The
key space of this work is larger than
Ref [1, 8, 31, 44, 47], but smaller than the scheme
in [10]. However the NPCR and UACI values in
Ref [10] are smaller. In addition, the proposed
algorithm is faster than [1, 10, 31, 44, 47], but slower
than [8]. Although the algorithm in the approach of [8]
only takes 3.41ms for encryption, however this time is
only for one round encryption. The histograms showed
that the algorithm in [8] is not safe if using only one
round encryption, therefore it normally needs more
than six rounds to get a good security performance
which takes a long time to complete all these steps.
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Fig. 13 The decryption images under different occlusion
attacks. (a) the cipher-image have 12.5% occlusion, (b) the
decryption image of 25% occlusion, (c) the cipher-image have
50% occlusion, (d) the decryption image of 75% occlusion,
(e) the cipher-image have 50% occlusion, (f) the decryption
image of 50% occlusion, (g) the cipher-image have 75%
occlusion, (h) the decryption image of 75% occlusion.
 (a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Fig. 14 Cipher- and decrypted images under salt and pepper
noises with different levels. (a) Noise density=5%; (b) Noise
density=10%; (c) Noise density=20%; (d) Noise density=5%;
(e) Noise density=10%; (f) Noise density=20%.
 (a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Fig. 15 Cipher- and decrypted images under Gaussian
noises with different levels. (a) Mean=0, Variance=0.0001;
(b) Mean=0, Variance=0.0003; (c) Mean=0,
Variance=0.0005; (d) Mean=0, Variance=0.0001; (e)
Mean=0, Variance=0.0003; (f) Mean=0, Variance=0.0005.
Table 8 demonstrates that the proposed parallel image
encryption algorithm can achieve a fast encryption
speed and also a secure system performance.
Table 7 Execution time of the proposed system (unit:ms).
Process Time
The quantification process 0.5198
The construction of encryption matrix 0.3825
The pixel permutation and diffusion process 1.8610
Others 0.6732
Total 3.4365
 
The 
quantification 
process
15.13%
The 
construction of 
encryption
matrix
11.13%
The pixel
permutation
and diffusion
process
54.15%
Others
19.59%
Total Encryption Time (3.4365 ms)
Fig. 16 Average encryption percentage time of each
component of the proposed algorithm for Lena of size 512 ×
512.
Table 8 Performance comparisons with other research works.
Algorithms Entropy Key space NPCR UACI Time
(ms)
Ref. [44] 7.9971 1096 99.59% 33.25% 175.00
Ref. [31] 7.9973 2128 99.61% 33.36% 119.80
Ref. [47] 7.9993 −− 81.20% 27.39% 34.78
Ref. [1] 7.9960 7.2× 2134 99.57% 35.08% 9.77
Ref. [8] 7.8190 2448 99.63% 31.15% 3.14
Ref. [10] 7.9993 [(N2)!]nmLnm 99.60% 28.60% 7.00
Ref. [43] 7.9992 −− 99.62% 33.46% 65
Ref. [38] 7.9914 2561 99.61% 33.47% 438
Ref. [42] −− 1084 99.61% 33.40% 113.9
This work 7.9994 10150×2256 99.62% 33.48% 3.44
6 Conclusions
In this paper, a robust parallel image encryption
algorithm is proposed. It uses plain-image and
external keys to design a novel decimal quantization
scheme and construct an encryption matrix. Four
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chaotic sequences are constructed by the combination
of the PWLCM and FDHCM. The chaotic sequences
and encryption matrix are used to control the
permutation and diffusion processes. The proposed
algorithm is implemented based on the GPU device
using the OpenCL technique. It achieves a fast
computing speed. The security performance is
evaluated by using key space analysis, statistical
analysis, sensitivity analysis, and robustness analysis.
Experimental results show that the proposed
cryptosystem has a large key space and is resistant to
entropy, differential and chosen/known plain-image
attacks.
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